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ALL OR NOTHING: WHY THE 
SUPREME COURT SAS MANDATE DOES 
NOT ELIMINATE THE SHAW SAFE 
HARBOR 
MATT JOHNSON, MICHAEL LAVINE, DANIEL KAZHDAN PH.D., LISA 
FURBY, DAVID ANDERSON 
INTRODUCTION 
The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) has become one of the 
busiest patent dockets in the United States. It is on track to receive over 
1,500 requests for America Invents Act (“AIA”) trials in the fiscal year 
2018.1 Most of these requests are for inter partes review (“IPR”), through 
which petitioners can challenge an issued patent based on prior-art “patents 
or printed publications.”2 While wildly popular as a mechanism for 
reviewing issued patents, the PTAB has not lived up to all stakeholders’ 
expectations as a method for one-stop resolution of patent validity. 
When IPRs were enacted, Congress added an “estoppel” provision: 
once the PTAB upholds a patent in a Final Written Decision, the petitioner, 
its privies, and its real parties-in-interest are estopped from challenging the 
patent “on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have 
raised during that inter partes review.” 35 U.S.C. § 315(e). Some felt that 
once the Patent Office institutes an IPR, the IPR should, therefore, operate 
as a complete substitute for district court challenges to patent claims under 
35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 based on patents and printed publications. For 
example, when the Senate was discussing the AIA, Senator Grassley 
expressed his hope that instituted IPRs would “completely substitute for at 
least the patents-and-printed-publications portion of the civil litigation.”3 
 
 1. Trial Statistics IPR, PGR, CBM, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (July 2018), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial_statistics_20180731.pdf. 
 2. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012). 
 3. 157 CONG. REC. S1360-94 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of S. Grassley). 
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Federal Circuit Judge Newman has likewise described IPRs as a “complete 
alternative and complete substitution” for district-court litigation.4 
But that has not been the case. If the Patent Office refused to institute 
an IPR on some grounds, as it used to do routinely, courts would allow 
petitioners to raise those non-instituted grounds in later district-court 
litigation.5 Thus, patent owners and petitioners would frequently have to 
litigate the same patent and the same claims both before the PTAB and 
before a district court. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in SAS 
Institute Inc. v. Iancu will reduce such fractured litigations,6 but as this 
article shows, SAS will not eliminate them entirely. 
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I summarizes the Patent 
Office’s pre-SAS approach of partially instituting IPRs. When the Patent 
Office only instituted review on some grounds, courts (most notably the 
Federal Circuit in Shaw Industries v. Automated Creel Systems) generally 
allowed petitioners to re-raise those non-instituted grounds in later district-
court proceedings. Part II explains that the Supreme Court’s SAS decision 
and its progeny largely prevents partial institutions, and therefore, many of 
the thorny estoppel issues will no longer arise. However, as Part III notes, 
the Patent Office continues to only partially institute review when multiple 
grounds are raised in multiple petitions. Thus, estoppel questions will still 
arise. The Conclusion addresses potential strategy implications for 
petitioners and patent owners. 
THE PATENT OFFICE’S APPROACH PRE-SAS ALLOWED FOR PARTIAL 
INSTITUTION OF A SINGLE PETITION 
Prior to SAS, the Patent Office regulations permitted the PTAB to 
simplify cases by instituting trial on only “some of the challenged claims” 
and only “some of the grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”7 
The Patent Office’s approach in SAS is illustrative. SAS filed an IPR 
petition seeking review of one of ComplementSoft’s patents. The petition 
 
 4. SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Newman, J., 
concurring in part). 
 5. See generally Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 
2016); see also Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2017); HP 
Inc. v. MPHJ Tech. Inv., LLC, 817 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. 
Toshiba Corp., 221 F. Supp. 3d 534, 553 (D. Del. 2016); Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, 
Inc., No. 3:12-cv-05501-SI, 2017 WL 235048, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2017); and Finjan, Inc. v. Blue 
Coat Sys., 283 F. Supp. 3d 839, 856–57 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
 6. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018). 
 7. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2012). 
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challenged all 16 claims of the patent.
8
 The Board instituted IPR for only 
claims 1 and 3-10, denying institution for claims 2 and 11-16.
9
 In its final 
written decision, the Board found claims 1, 3 and 5-10 unpatentable but did 
not address any of the claims that were not instituted.10 SAS appealed, 
arguing that the Board was required to review all of the claims identified in 
SAS’s petition and that it was unfair that the validity of the uninstituted 
claims would have to be relitigated in district court.11 The Federal Circuit 
rejected this argument.12 
The Patent Office’s pre-SAS partial-institution approach raised a 
difficult estoppel question. As petitioners routinely argued, it would seem 
to be unfair to estop a petitioner from re-raising, to a district court, grounds 
that the Patent Office refused to consider in the first place. The Federal 
Circuit agreed. In Shaw, it held that a petitioner is not estopped from 
raising non-instituted grounds in a district court proceeding if the Patent 
Office refused to institute on those grounds in an IPR. According to Shaw, 
“[t]he IPR does not begin until it is instituted,” and the very fact that the 
Patent Office denies institution is evidence that the petitioner “did not 
raise—nor could it have reasonably raised—the [non-instituted] ground 
during the IPR.”13 
THE PATENT OFFICE CAN NO LONGER PARTIALLY INSTITUTE IPR 
PETITIONS 
In SAS, the Supreme Court rejected the Patent Office’s practice of 
instituting IPR petitions on only some of the claims challenged in the 
petition. The Court marshaled a number of arguments. First, “in an inter 
partes review the petitioner is master of its complaint and normally entitled 
to judgment on all of the claims it raises.”14 Second, the Court emphasized 
the statutory command that the Board address “‘any patent claim 
 
8. SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, IPR2013-00226, Paper 1 at 11–12 (P.T.A.B., Mar. 
29, 2013). 
9. SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, IPR2013-00226, Paper 9 at 22 (P.T.A.B., Aug. 12, 
2013). 
 10. SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, IPR2013-00226, Paper 38 (P.T.A.B., Aug. 6, 2014). 
 11. SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016), reh’g denied, 842 
F.3d 1223 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 
accord HP Inc. v. MPHJ Tech. Inv., LLC, 817 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he noninstituted 
grounds do not become a part of the IPR . . . [T]he noninstituted grounds were not raised and, as review 
was denied, could not be raised in the IPR.”). 
 14. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355 (2018). 
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challenged by the petitioner.’”15 According to the majority, this required a 
decision on the patentability of “every claim.”16 The Supreme Court’s SAS 
decision is thus clear that, when a trial is instituted, every claim requested 
by the petitioner must be included and addressed in the Final Written 
Decision. 
SAS does not explicitly resolve whether “all grounds” presented in a 
petition must also be included in an instituted trial. On the one hand, the 
quoted statutory provision about “any patent claim” does not address 
multiple grounds. On the other hand, the master-of-its-complaint rationale 
would seem to apply to grounds as well as to claims. Shortly after SAS, the 
Patent Office decided that, if it instituted an IPR, it would do so not only on 
all of the challenged claims, as is required by SAS, but also “on all 
challenges raised in the petition.”17 The Federal Circuit has since ratified 
that stance, explaining that “equal treatment of claims and grounds for 
institution purposes has pervasive support in SAS.”18 
THE PTAB’S POST-SAS TREATMENT OF MULTIPLE PETITIONS 
CHALLENGING A COMMON PATENT 
SAS and its progeny partially solve the estoppel problem addressed by 
Shaw. The Patent Office can no longer institute only some petitioned-for 
grounds if all the grounds are raised in a single petition. It has a binary 
choice of either instituting all grounds or none. But what if multiple 
grounds are raised in multiple petitions, and the Patent Office institutes 
some petitions but not others—what this article will call “mixed-institution 
cases”? In those cases, the PTAB might not resolve all §§ 102 and 103 
disputes. Under Shaw, it might be that the grounds raised in such non-
instituted petitions could be raised in subsequent district-court litigations, 
without any potential estoppel. If so, patent owners and petitioners would 
still face the possibility of having to litigate the validity of a patent in 
multiple fora. This is not an edge-case issue; one-third of all patents 
 
 15. Id. at 1354 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 318(a)). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Guidance on the Impact of SAS on AIA Trial Proceedings, USPTO, (Apr. 26, 2018), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/guidance_on_the_impact_of_sas_on_aia_trial_pro
ceedings_%20(april_26,_2018).pdf. 
 18. Adidas AG v. Nike, Inc., 894 F.3d 1256, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting PGS Geophysical AS 
v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)) (citations omitted). 
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challenged at the Patent Office are challenged via multiple petitions.19 The 
authors expect that mixed institutions will arise regularly. 
We have identified at least ten post-SAS mixed institution cases. A 
selection of these occurrences is discussed in detail below. Interestingly, 
none of the decisions note SAS as being a factor that is relevant to 
instituting trial in one IPR but not the other. Moreover, we have identified 
no instances in which the PTAB relied on SAS as a basis for instituting a 
second IPR after already instituting a first IPR challenging the same patent. 
The PTAB seemingly does not consider SAS to be a relevant factor across 
multiple petitions challenging the same patent. 
A SURVEY OF MIXED POST-SAS PTAB INSTITUTIONS ACROSS 
PETITIONS CHALLENGING A COMMON PATENT 
Several of the Patent Office’s denials in mixed-institution cases were 
based on non-substantive, discretionary reasons.20 Most of these are based 
on the PTAB’s view that petitioners should not be allowed to “strategically 
stage their prior art and arguments in multiple petitions, using our decisions 
as a roadmap, until a ground is found that results in the grant of review.”21 
In its General Plastic Industries Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha 
precedential decision, the PTAB enumerated seven relevant factors for 
determining whether to deny institution based on another petition 
challenging the same patent.22 Running afoul of the General Plastic timing 
 
 19. See David P. Ruschke et al., Chat with the Chief, An Analysis of Multiple Petitions in AIA 
Trials, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Oct. 24, 2017), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Chat_with_the_Chief_Boardside_Chat_Multiple_P
etition_Study_20171024.pdf. 
 20. See e.g., BASF SE v. Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc., IPR2018-00283, Paper No. 7 at 5 
(P.T.A.B. June 11, 2018) (noting that “[i]nstitution of inter partes review is discretionary.”). 
 21. Gen. Plastic Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, 2017 WL 3917706, 
at *7 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 6, 2017). 
 22. Id. at *7. The Board identified seven nonexclusive factors that bear on the issue of whether the 
Board should invoke its discretion to deny institution of an IPR, based on a follow-on petition on the 
same patent, under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a): (1) whether the same petitioner previously filed a petition 
directed to the same claims of the same patent; (2) whether at the time of filing of the first petition the 
petitioner knew of the prior art asserted in the second petition or should have known of it; (3) whether at 
the time of filing of the second petition the petitioner already received the patent owner’s preliminary 
response to the first petition or received the Board’s decision on whether to institute review in the first 
petition; (4) the length of time that elapsed between the time the petitioner learned of the prior art 
asserted in the second petition and the filing of the second petition; (5) whether the petitioner provides 
adequate explanation for the time elapsed between the filings of multiple petitions directed to the same 
claims of the same patent; (6) the finite resources of the Board; and (7) the requirement under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 316(a)(11) to issue a final determination not later than one year after the date on which the Director 
notices institution of review. 
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factors can result in denial of an institution, even when the IPR is proper 
and might otherwise be instituted. 
Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc. v. Oyster Optics, LLC, IPR2018-00070; -
00257 is illustrative. In October 2017, a number of petitioners sought IPR 
of Oyster’s patent (the -00070 matter). Five weeks later, those same 
petitioners filed a second petition (the -00257 matter) that challenged the 
same claims using different prior art. In its preliminary response, the patent 
owner urged the Patent Office to exercise its discretion to deny institution 
in the second matter. The Board analyzed the issue under the General 
Plastic framework and concluded that the petitioners had “not provided an 
adequate explanation for the time elapsed between the filing of the ‘0070 
Petition and [the ‘00257] Petition.”23 The Board also observed that the 
petitioners “ha[d] not explained why we should institute on another set of 
grounds that rely on [overlapping secondary references].”24 These factors 
convinced the Board to exercise its discretion and not institute.25 
Other denials in mixed-institution cases were based on one petition 
failing to meet the substantive threshold for an institution. For example, in 
 
 23. Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc. v. Oyster Optics, LLC, IPR2018-00257, Paper No. 14 at 25 
(P.T.A.B. June 4, 2018). 
 24. Id. at 26. 
 25. Additional examples of the Board exercising its discretionary authority under § 314(a) to 
institute trial on a first petition but not a second challenging a common patent: compare Am. Honda 
Motor Co., Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, IPR2018-00443 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 25, 2018) with Honda 
Motor Co., Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, IPR2018-00348 (P.T.A.B. June 27, 2018) (joining 
Honda to a preexisting IPR in -00443 but denying institution in -00348 largely based on General Plastic 
Factor 3, because Honda had seen certain patent owner briefing prior to filing its -00348 petition); 
compare Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, IPR2018-00442 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 
25, 2018) with Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, No. IPR2018-00347 
(P.T.A.B. June 27, 2018) (denying institution in the -00347 matter on similar facts as in -00348 
discussed above); compare BASF SE v. Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc., IPR2017-01948 (P.T.A.B. 
Mar. 12, 2018) with BASF SE v. Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc., IPR2017-00283 (P.T.A.B. June 
11, 2018) (instituting trial in the -01948 matter while noting weaknesses in the petitioner’s position on 
some dependent claims but denying institution in the -00283 matter that presented augmented grounds 
to “patch holes” in the -01948 grounds for those dependent claims using references of which petitioner 
was aware when filing the -01948 petition); compare Instrumentation Lab. Co. v. Hemosonics LLC, 
IPR2017-00855 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 1, 2017) with Instrumentation Lab. Co. v. Hemosonics LLC, IPR2017-
00264 (P.T.A.B. May 10, 2018) (instituting trial in the -00855 matter while noting weaknesses in the 
petitioner’s position on some claims but denying institution in the -00264 matter based on General 
Plastic Factor 3 because the follow-on petition used the -00855 Institution Decision as a roadmap for 
tailoring the -00264 petition). 
An example of the Board exercising its discretionary authority under § 325(d) to institute trial on a first 
petition but not a second petition challenging the same patent is Align Tech., Inc. v. 3Shape A/S, No. 
IPR2018-00198 (P.T.A.B. May 30, 2018) (instituting all grounds presented the -00197 matter but 
exercising discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to deny the -00198 petition because arguments were 
presented by the patent owner during prosecution regarding why a patent that is closely related to one of 
petitioner’s secondary references does not disclose what petitioner alleged). 
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RPX Corp. v. Spycurity LLC,
26
 RPX challenged the same claims of a patent 
across two petitions, but the grounds presented across the two petitions 
differed in their primary references.
27
 The PTAB instituted trial in the 
IPR2018-00305 case but found the motivation to combine certain 
references in the IPR2018-00304 matter unconvincing.28 
These types of cases raise important estoppel questions. Can the 
petitioners in Alcatel-Lucent raise the grounds that were in the non-
instituted petition in a later district-court proceeding? Can RPX? Under 
Shaw, arguably they could. 
Because the General Plastic timing factors are known, and petition 
timing is controlled by the petitioner, a petitioner theoretically could craft 
its petitions in a way that one is likely to be denied. For example, the 
petitioner could file a first petition containing the grounds that it wishes to 
present to the PTAB. Three months later, the same petitioner could file a 
second petition that contains the grounds it wishes to preserve for use in 
district court. The Patent Office would likely deny the second petition 
under General Plastic, potentially avoiding any estoppel. If the petitioner 
were not estopped from raising the grounds from the second petition in 
district court, the petitioner would have a workaround to the one-stop-
shopping that some see as a goal of the AIA. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in SAS will mitigate the number of 
cases in which the same patent and claims are litigated in two different 
 
26. RPX Corp. v. Spycurity LLC, IPR2018-00304 (P.T.A.B. June 22, 2018); RPX Corp. v. 
Spycurity LLC, IPR2018-00305 (P.T.A.B. June 22, 2018). 
27. Compare RPX Corp. v. Spycurity LLC, IPR2018-00304, Paper 2 at 2 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 
2017) (citing Crawford) with RPX Corp. v. Spycurity LLC, IPR2018-00305 Paper 2 at 2 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 
19, 2017) (citing Staples). 
 28. Additional examples of the Board exercising its discretionary authority to institute trial on a 
first petition but not a second challenging a common patent for substantive reasons: compare GBT Inc. 
v. Walletx Microelectronics LTD, IPR2018-00325 (P.T.A.B. July 3, 2018) with GBT Inc. v. Walletx 
Microelectronics LTD, IPR2018-00326 (P.T.A.B. July 5, 2018) (instituting trial in -00326 but denying 
institution in -00325 based on grounds relying on a different primary reference); compare ZTE (USA) 
Inc. v. Fundamental Innovation Sys. Int’l LLC, IPR2018-00110 (P.T.A.B. May 8, 2018) with ZTE 
(USA) Inc. v. Fundamental Innovation Sys. Int’l LLC, IPR2018-00111 (P.T.A.B. May 9, 2018) 
(instituting trial in -00111 but denying institution in -00110 based on grounds relying on a different 
primary reference); compare Sanofi Pasteur Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., IPR2018-00187 (P.T.A.B. June 5, 2018) 
with Sanofi Pasteur Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., IPR2018-00188 (P.T.A.B. June 5, 2018) (instituting trial in -
00187 but denying institution in -00188 based on grounds relying on a different primary reference); 
compare Propel Orthodontics, LLC v. Orthoaccel Techs., Inc., IPR2018-00296 (P.T.A.B. June 11, 
2018) with Propel Orthodontics, LLC v. Orthoaccel Techs., Inc., IPR2018-00398 (P.T.A.B. July 5, 
2018) (instituting trial in -00296 but denying institution in -00398 based on grounds relying a different 
primary reference). 
  
40 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. | PTAB BAR ASSOCIATION Vol 18:2 
 
tribunals—generally the PTAB and a district court. The PTAB will have to 
institute IPR on all the grounds raised in the petition, and its decision will 
estop a losing petitioner from re-raising those same grounds in district 
court. However, even after SAS, the Patent Office does not have to institute 
every petition that challenges the same patent. Thus, there may still be non-
instituted patent challenges—challenges that, under Shaw, a petitioner 
could potentially later raise in district court. Creative petitioners may use 
this loophole to their advantage. They could file a first petition with 
arguments they want to raise to the PTAB; and later, the petitioner could 
file a second petition based on art it wants to keep for district court 
litigation. Because of the delay in filing, the Patent Office would likely 
deny the second petition. A petitioner could thus provide itself with an 
argument that those backup grounds fall within the Shaw’s safe harbor, in 
which non-instituted grounds are not subject to estoppel, resulting in those 
grounds being available in district court proceedings even if the PTAB 
challenge proves unsuccessful. 
Patent owners should be aware of such strategies. They might 
affirmatively ask the Patent Office to issue a consistent ruling on all the 
petitions—either institute all the petitions or deny all of them. Or they 
might argue to the district court that allowing such machinations is 
inequitable or otherwise improper. For example, they could argue that the 
petitioner “reasonably could have raised” all the grounds raised in the 
second petition in the first petition and, thus, the petitioner is estopped from 
raising those grounds in the district court. 
Shaw appears to remain good law that provides a viable, safe harbor 
for non-instituted grounds. Although it will be implicated less frequently 
post-SAS, PTAB practitioners should remain cognizant of Shaw’s operation 
and be ready to capitalize or defend against it when circumstances dictate. 
